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Tuition Cuts: The Political Dynamics of
Higher Education Finance
By Michael N. Bastedo
Michael N. Bastedo is an
assistant professor in the
Center for the Study of
Higher and Postsecondary
Education at the University
of Michigan.

Increasingly, states are restricting tuition growth through political pressure and statewide governing and coordinating boards.
During the 1990s, California, Virginia, and New York all cut or
restrained tuition, and recently Michigan, Florida, Illinois, and
New Jersey have restricted tuition growth either through legislation or intense gubernatorial pressure. This case study examines
the most extensive use of tuition cuts nationally, in the state of
Massachusetts from 1995 to 2001. This case reveals the causes
and effects of tuition cuts as a policy measure, and also the political dynamics underlying public higher education finance in increasingly politicized environments.

E

ach year, the College Board’s Trends in College
Pricing reveals substantial increases in public college tuition and fees. In 2004, tuition and fees increased
by an average of 10% in four-year public college and 9% for
two-year colleges (College Board, 2004). Over the past ten years,
in constant 2004 dollars, tuition and fees increased 52% at fouryear colleges and 26% at two-year colleges. These are undoubtedly major issues for parents and students, although scholars
debate the causes of these increases and whether college prices
are truly “out of control” (Ehrenberg, 2002; Johnstone, 2001;
Mumper & Freeman, 2005). What is known is that college prices
and costs have become a major political issue at both the state
and national levels (Boehner and McKeon, 2003; Kane & Orszag,
2003; Wolanin, 2003).
More rarely noted is the increasing phenomenon of states
that have restricted tuition growth or have even cut tuition over
an extended period. During the 1990s, California, Virginia, and
New York all cut or restrained tuition during extended periods
of state revenue growth. In the past few years, Florida, Michigan, Illinois and New Jersey have restricted tuition growth,
through either legislative acts or intense gubernatorial pressure.
Illinois now guarantees four years of stable tuition and fees to
incoming undergraduates, and similar proposals are moving
forward in Indiana and at the State University of New York. It
seems that every week during the legislative season there are
new proposals to restrict tuition growth or centralize decision
making for tuition charges in legislatures or statewide governing boards.
To date, the most extensive tuition cuts have occurred
in the state of Massachusetts from 1995 to 2001. In 1995, the
governor appointed a new chairman to the state’s Board of Higher
Education (BHE), James F. Carlin, who ensured that tuition at
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public colleges would be cut for six consecutive years, for a total
reduction of nearly one-third. In addition, the board enacted
the Tuition Advantage Program, which lowered tuition prices by
a third for students who transferred with a B average from a
community college. The state combined this program with an
initiative that made community colleges free of charge for students with family incomes below $36,000. As a result, the board
was both lowering the price of college for many students while
strongly encouraging students to enroll in community colleges
(Bastedo & Gumport, 2003).
This article reports results from a qualitative research
study of activist policymaking in Massachusetts. Activist governing boards are those that take an aggressive and independent role in higher education policymaking, compared to traditional state governing boards, which emphasize routine compliance and incremental policy change (Bastedo, 2005a). Over 20
interviews were conducted with state policymakers, campus
presidents, and faculty union leaders to examine a wide range
of changes in state policy, from academic standards to tuition
financing. Each interview was taped and transcribed, verbatim.
Hundreds of media reports and public interviews were collected
from sources across the state, from the Boston Globe to the Berkshire Eagle. Internal documents, both public and confidential,
were made available to the researcher, including memoranda,
correspondence, and policy drafts. The quotations used throughout were drawn from these primary sources. The result is a rich
description of the politics and policymaking of tuition setting in
public higher education.

Massachusetts
Enacts Tuition
Cuts

Although Carlin’s six-year record of tuition reductions was certainly unique in Massachusetts history—indeed, in the history
of public colleges—the state had made prior efforts to rationalize tuition policy. Beginning in 1980, the state board had the
power to set tuition rates at all public campuses, but each campus was authorized to establish and raise its own fees. In addition, all tuition reverted to the state’s General Fund, while fees
were retained on each campus. Tuition was then sent back to
the campus by state appropriation. The result of these policies
was a system of financing that circulated money through the
public sector. The state board had no incentive to pass tuition
increases that would simply be poured into the state coffers
without any impact on campus appropriations. Fees set by the
campus were unrestrained, meaning that there was no centralized control of student prices.
The result was severe increases in tuition and fees during years of state fiscal crisis (Bastedo, 2005b). During the flush
fiscal years of the “Massachusetts Miracle,” a period of strong
economic growth from 1983 to 1988, tuition increased only 10%
to 15% overall (Gold, 1995). But fees rose by 76%, six times the
rate of tuition and twice the Higher Education Price Index. Once
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the state’s fiscal crisis began in 1988, the situation grew worse
as state appropriations fell and student charges increased accordingly. Between fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 1994, tuition rose an average of 48%, and fees, which often constituted
more than half of student costs, rose 240% (Wallin, 1995).
In response to the fiscal crisis, the state board pursued
a high-tuition policy. According to Chancellor Franklyn Jenifer,
this was necessary to maintain a “margin of excellence” that
would ensure academic quality (Gold, 1995). He stated,
There are some who believe that a better way to assure
accessibility is to keep tuitions low or to charge no tuition at all. The net effect of such a policy is to provide a
substantial subsidy for everyone who attends a public
college or university, regardless of income. In this scheme,
the link between the ability to pay and financial aid is
severed. Lower tuition is generally associated with a relatively low commitment to financial aid; this policy actually works against access for needier students who require affirmative financial assistance to meet costs beyond tuition. (p. 18)
Affirmative financial assistance was not forthcoming,
however. From fiscal years 1990 to 1992, state scholarship aid
was cut by more than half, from $77.6 million to $35.0 million
(Bastedo, 2005b). The maximum award for the neediest students dropped from $3,800 to $1,900. State scholarship aid fell
so low that the state was forced to return $2 million in financial
aid to the U.S. Department of Education for failing to meet federal requirements for minimum support. As is typical in response
to state economic cycles tuition and fee increases were not rolled
back once state revenues had rebounded.
During the fiscal crisis, Carlin was a trustee of the University of Massachusetts (UMass), and chaired the board’s finance committee. Year after year as he signed off on large increases in tuition and fees, these actions weighed on his mind.
At his first BHE meeting as chair, in November 1995, Carlin
characterized his complicity in the tuition and fee increases as
“embarrassing” and called student charges “absolutely outrageous” (Dembner, 1995, p. 33). Community college tuition and
fees were the highest in the country, and UMass-Amherst was
one of the most expensive research universities, after the University of Vermont and the University of New Hampshire. From
the beginning of his tenure as BHE chair, Carlin made it clear
that he wholly rejected the high-tuition policy pursued by prior
boards. “I’m an advocate for the kids, who are struggling and
taking on loans, and for the parents, who are struggling to pay
the bills,” he said (Dembner, 1995, p. 33).
Carlin promised to put forward legislation, through a
sympathetic legislator, that would give the board the power to
set all student charges. In the meantime, he proposed a 5% cut
in tuition for fiscal year 1997.
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Initial legislative response was only somewhat favorable.
The cut would reduce state revenues by $9.5 million, and some
legislators were in favor of cutting campus appropriations accordingly. Carlin indicated that he could live with some budget
cuts to get student charges reduced. “Students are paying too
damn much money to go to a public institution,” he said. “You’ve
got to whack [charges] down and then go from there. The truth
of the matter is kids are paying too much money.” (Cornell,
1996a, p. 16). Ultimately, Carlin achieved a 10% cut in tuition
at the community colleges and a 5% cut at the state colleges.
And although Governor Weld recommended a 30% cut in state
appropriations for fiscal year 1997, which he said was to encourage campuses to increase private funding, the legislature
ensured that the campuses received a modest increase. (Cornell,
1996a).
UMass proved to be a stronger foe. According to statute,
the BHE had the authority to approve UMass tuition charges,
but not to set them. UMass president William Bulger announced
in March 1996 that undergraduate tuition would remain stable,
but fees would increase across the system. For UMass, this made
sense politically, in that it did not irritate legislators by reducing revenue for the state, yet it increased campus resources.
Bulger knew that his proposal would be unpopular with the
BHE, however. “It’s obvious to everyone what the popular thing
to do would be,” Bulger told his trustees. “Fasten your seat belts
for a while, it’s going to be a long ride” (Cornell, 1996c, p. 5).
The UMass board voted to support his fee increases.
Carlin and the state board, however, insisted upon a cut
by refusing to approve the UMass recommendation on tuition.
“If we truly believe as a body that our university and state colleges are too expensive, then we need to do something about it,”
fiscal committee chair Tamara Davis said. “We are looking at
the university as part of a system of higher education and there
should be consistent policy” (Cornell, 1996c, p. 5).
UMass was forced to capitulate, but Carlin was conciliatory in victory. “I think the trustees have done an excellent job
over the last three years leveling out tuition. But that still doesn’t
make up for the skyrocketing increase from 1990 to 1993”
(Dembner, 1996b, p. B1).
That was not much of a salve to angry UMass trustees.
“It’s kind of degrading to the entire board,” said one. “What good
is it having a board of trustees if [the BHE] just overrules it?”
(Dembner, 1996b, p. B1).
The following year, the BHE again proposed tuition cuts
in the range of 5% to 6%. Carlin was furious that fee increases
had undermined the previous year’s tuition cut. “We’re doing
the tuition cuts and we’re remaining even,” he said. “It’s crazy”
(Dembner, 1996c, p. B7). His attempt at legislating his way around
the problem—by placing authority to set campus fees with the
BHE—was thwarted by the legislature. Instead, he coerced the
36
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“Parents are mortgaging their homes,
dipping into their
401(k)s, deferring
retirement so they can
pay for these tuitions,”
[Carlin said] “and the
colleges just stand
there with a stack of
loan forms.”

campuses into reducing fees by sheer force of will, by threatening and cajoling them. In public, he argued that public education was too expensive and charges had to be reduced. In private, he worked with board members and college presidents in
a more conciliatory manner.
To Carlin, high student charges were connected to a host
of other ills plaguing higher education. “I think parents and
kids and taxpayers have had it with [students] leaving colleges
burdened down with loans,” he said in 1997. “They’re tired of
needing seven years to complete a four-year program because
they have to work full time just to afford it” (Perlman, 1997, p.
1A).
At the end of his term in 1999, Carlin was pushing the
affordability issue just as hard. “If they were getting less and
colleges were charging less, maybe people wouldn’t care as
much... But most people will agree, we’re paying more and getting less. Parents are mortgaging their homes, dipping into their
401(k)s, deferring retirement so they can pay for these tuitions,
and the colleges just stand there with a stack of loan forms”
(Zernike, 1999, p. B1).
Carlin argued that the problem was management.
“Clearly, the reason tuition is high is that college costs are high.
Why are costs high? Nobody is in charge,” he said. “The president is supposed to stay away from academic matters, which
are the faculty’s turf... Because presidents rarely are able to
take charge, colleges and universities become top-heavy. Academic and administrative staffs have layer after layer of personnel” (Carlin, 1999, p. A76). The solution, he said, was to ensure
that presidents and trustees had the power to make changes
and to be accountable for those changes. Ultimately, though,
the tuition issue was deeply personal for Carlin. He said,
If not for that University of Florida $75 tuition, I would
have gone into the U.S. Army, like a lot of my friends
did. So when people ask me why I do these things, I do it
for the kids and for the parents. What burns me is, every time you would raise a point to the faculty about
teaching a few more hours... they would say, “Stop attacking higher education, stop being an enemy of the
students.” Well, thanks to what this board has done,
kids are paying $30 million less to go to the University of
Massachusetts, in the aggregate, and their degree is
worth more. (Zernike, 1999, p. B1)
Carlin’s populist message sold well with the public and
the media, if not with the state’s faculty. William Murphy, president of the state college union, suggested to The Boston Globe
that reducing tuition would make the public believe that public
higher education was not worth as much as it used to be
(Dembner, 1996a, p. 1). The media rejected this analysis completely, editorializing that the cuts were perhaps Carlin’s only
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unmitigated success. “At a time when the costs of higher education continue to increase faster than inflation across the nation,” the MetroWest Daily News said in 1999, “his 25% reduction is quite an accomplishment” (“Carlin’s Legacy,” p. A12).
The Worcester Telegram & Gazette (“Keeping Commitment,” 2000)
was in enthusiastic agreement. “By maintaining tuition at a rate
affordable to all,” one editorial said, “the board is wisely investing in the long-term prosperity of the state as well as the personal and economic well-being of thousands of Massachusetts
residents” (p. A10).
Considering his complete lack of legal authority to lower
fees, Carlin’s record was remarkable. Community colleges reduced fees for three consecutive years, UMass for three nonconsecutive years, and the state colleges for two (see Table 1).
BHE fiscal director Dale Hamel was impressed by Carlin’s ability to get fees reduced without statutory authority:
You know, the first thing [Carlin] asked us to do was lay
out the statute, what was black, what was white, what
was gray. He said, we’re taking all the gray, and let’s go
over here in to the white and take some of that too until
somebody tells us we can’t do that. Fees are an example.
We were telling people what to do on fees. There’s no
statute that says that the BHE can even comment on
fees. That’s the pure responsibility of the institution.
(D. Hamel, personal interview, 2005)
In part, Carlin was able to use his influence in the legislature to support his fee reduction policy. In arguing for increases
in state appropriations, Carlin was able to “backfill” any decreases

Table 1
Tuition and Fees at Massachusetts Public Colleges,
Fall 1995 to Fall 2003
Fall 1995

Fall 2001

6-Year
Change

Fall 2003

University of
Massachusetts
Tuition
Tuition and fees

$2,106
$4,954

$1,629
$4,699

-22.6%
-5.1%

$6,801

44.7%

State Colleges
Tuition
Tuition and fees

$1,413
$3,334

$954
$2,957

-32.5%
-11.3%

$4,590

55.2%

Community Colleges
Tuition
$1,196
Tuition and fees
$2,520

$735
$2,279

-38.5%
-9.6%

$3,265

43.3%

System Average
Tuition
Tuition and fees

$1,067
$3,246

-32.1%
-9.5%

$4,753

46.4%

$1,571
$3,586

Source: Board of Higher Education, 2006. Averages are weighted by enrollment.
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2-Year
Change

Table 2
National Comparison of Change in
Resident Tuition and Fee Rates,
Fall 1997 to Fall 2001
Massachusetts Average

National Average

Undergraduate
University Campuses
All Four-year Colleges
Community Colleges

-2.3%
-4.0%
-6.8%

+21.1%
+21.5%
+24.2%

Graduate
All Four-year Campuses

+5.7%

+24.2%

Source: Board of Higher Education, 2006; College Board, 2004.

in fees with increases in appropriations, ensuring that any fee
cuts would be revenue neutral for campuses. Legislative support was thus even more salient to the board’s tuition and fees
policy than support from the executive office.
Carlin departed from the BHE in late 1999 due to illness, but his successor as chairman, Stephen Tocco, declared
his intention to continue the board’s tuition policy. He was
backed up by the governor’s office, a strong supporter of Carlin
throughout his term, but the legislature was never quite as enthusiastic. Each tuition cut reduced state revenues by millions
of dollars, and legislative support evaporated when revenues
began to decline in 2000. The BHE was squeezed between an
executive branch that insisted on tuition cuts and a legislative
branch equally insistent that the cuts needed to stop. The board
originally settled on a compromise position, where tuition would
be held stable for all segments in the next year. In response to
executive pressure, however, the board ultimately voted to cut
tuition at the state colleges for fall 2001.
By 2002, the revenue situation in Massachusetts had
become dire. Ten million dollars had been cut from scholarship
programs mid-year, and campuses were ordered to make midyear budget concessions as well, reminding many of the financial ills of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Tuition remained
stable by BHE order, but fees increased dramatically. The average increase in student charges was 18.2% in just one year, and
two campuses increased charges by half. The increase of 51.1%
at Bridgewater State College was the second highest in the country that year, and the 29.6% hike at Salem State College was the
eighth highest.
In retrospect, staff members questioned whether cutting
tuition and fees over six years was a good idea. “For five years we
had no increases and now, here we are with the first major budget
cut and the first thing we do is go sock it to the students with a
huge mid-year increase because we can’t survive otherwise,”
UMass vice president Daphne Layton said. “Wouldn’t it have
NASFAA JOURNAL OF STUDENT FINANCIAL AID
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been easier on everybody and made more sense to just have
modest increases over the years and not go from one extreme to
the other?” (D. Layton, personal interview, 2005). BHE Vice
Chancellor Jack Warner agreed:
It makes better sense over time to incrementally do it.
But [Carlin] had a belief that one of the ways you created efficiencies is to choke revenues. I think that’s naïve.
It may work in some aspects of business but we know it
doesn’t work well in higher ed. You can’t simply choke
the resources and expect it to work. It just postpones
your need for revenue. (J. Warner, personal interview,
2005)
Board member Peter Nessen, on the other hand, thought
that the policy “worked well” overall. Politically he was concerned
about possible retribution from the legislature. “In retrospect, I
wish we had credited the legislature as much as we did ourselves on the exercise, because it was the legislature that found
the dollars that we had use of,” he said. “I think after a while,
they became very tired of us taking credit for the hard decisions
they had to make on places that wouldn’t get funded with the
dollars that we took. I began to hear the Legislature saying,
‘Enough’s enough now. Try to figure out other ways of funding
this affordability’” (P. Nessen, personal interview, 2005).
Carlin strongly disagreed with these criticisms, but was
reluctant to discuss the decisions of his successors publicly.
“I’m so upset about the fee increases, but unless you’re going to
go back in there and put the equipment on and get in the game
and play, you’ve got to be careful commenting on, you know,
what do you think of the board now?” he said. “I certainly
wouldn’t want a previous board commenting too publicly on
what we were doing and I think that I shouldn’t be commenting
on this one” (J. Carlin, personal interview, 2005).

The Tuition
Advantage
Program

Although the tuition cuts were moving forward, the BHE wanted
to develop new policy levers to reduce student costs. Beginning
in 1996, the board enacted the Tuition Advantage Program (TAP),
a policy designed to provide a financial incentive for community
college students to finish their degrees and transfer to a fouryear public college. The board’s director of fiscal policy, Dale
Hamel, wanted to smooth the transition between the two-year
and four-year sectors, in part by compensating for the increased
tuition charged by the four-year campuses. TAP would eliminate the financial disincentives associated with transfer, reduce
state costs per FTE, and redistribute some of the savings back
to students. Hamel and the board saw TAP as good public policy,
creatively combining the academic and financial goals of the
board within a single, easily understood program. According to
Hamel,
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By identifying the cost to the student, now you can begin to look at it from a statewide perspective. What’s the
efficient way, from a state perspective? Once you start
looking at the cost and you could see that the state subsidy as well as the price to students was less if they do
the first two years in the community colleges and then
transfer to the four-year colleges for the last years, everybody pays less and yet you still get to the same point
of a number of bachelor’s degrees. (D. Hamel, personal
interview, 2005)
Although the conceptual foundation of TAP was straightforward, there were a number of requirements designed to meet
BHE goals. Eligible students were required to earn an associate’s
degree in an approved transfer program with at least a 3.0 grade
point average and continue that achievement after transfer. If
students met these requirements, they would receive a one-third
tuition waiver for the next two years, making community college and four-year tuition charges nearly equivalent. Over those
next two years, students would save approximately $850 if they
transferred to a state college, and $1,200 if they transferred to
UMass.
Board members and staff unanimously hailed Hamel’s
idea as creative, even brilliant. It was innovative in combining
financial aid with broader policy goals to build a system of higher
education that efficiently produces graduates from the public
sector. From the beginning, improving the status and enrollment of the community colleges was a clearly stated goal. “What
we want to do,” Carlin said, “is get more students thinking about
going to community colleges to begin their careers in higher
education” (Sukiennik, 1996, p. 1). The board’s fiscal committee chair agreed. “It increases community college enrollment by
promoting community colleges as an access point, it provides a
reward for completing the first two years of education at a community college, and it decreases student cost” (Sukiennik, 1996).
UMass officials were more angry than jubilant. The
UMass board did not act for six months, and then used the
opportunity to blast the BHE for making policy without consultation. UMass officials were disturbed, they said, because the
program might create a division between transfer and regular
students. According to President Bulger, “It would result in the
students already on campus having more of an obligation”
(“Trustees Grudgingly Approve,” 1997, p. 1). Trustee Michael
Foley was irritated by the BHE’s approach to this issue, among
others. “This is not the first time that I, personally, have felt
blind-sided by the Board of Higher Education” (“Trustees Grudgingly Approve,” 1997). Nonetheless, the trustees endorsed the
program with only one dissenting vote.
In the first year of the program (fall 1998), far more UMass
students were able to take advantage of the tuition break than
state college students, by a margin of nearly seven to one. (Board
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of Higher Education, 2001) There was little growth in UMass
enrollment over the next two years, however, and by fall 2001,
almost 10 times as many students were enrolled in the program
at the state colleges, nearly matching the number at UMass. At
the state colleges, nearly half of all eligible students have been
able to take advantage of the tuition discount (Board of Higher
Education, 2001).

Community
College Access
Grants

Although TAP provided incentives for students to transfer from
a community college, Carlin wanted to provide an incentive for
students to enroll in community college in the first place. To
Carlin, community colleges were the primary access point for
poor and low-income students. In his second year as chairman
of the higher education board, Carlin outlined his strategy at a
meeting in the governor’s office in 1997: he wanted to completely
eliminate tuition and fees at all fifteen of the state’s community
colleges, irrespective of family income. In the beginning, he simply floated the concept as an idea. “Our priority has been to
lower tuition and fees at state colleges and universities, and
this plan is perfectly in line with that priority,” he said. “The
poorest students in the state go to community colleges, and
these schools are a port for immigrant students” (Chacon &
Zernike, 1997, p. A1). It was estimated that Carlin’s original
plan would cost $90 million in lost tuition revenue.
Initial response to the proposal was negative. Administrators at UMass and the other four-year colleges tended to be
angry and fearful. The financial aid director at UMass Amherst
said the result would be “a travesty of inequities.” “What makes
a community college student so special?” he argued. “That money
would be better spent assisting all the low-income students in
the public sector” (Healy, 1997, p. A41).
The strongest supporter was David Bartley, a former
Speaker of the House and subsequently the president of Holyoke
Community College. He noted that some students were so
shocked by the sticker price of his college that they never enrolled. “When they find out that it is going to cost them about
$2,500 before they buy books, they either drop the application
or they enroll in one or two courses, which is all they can afford,” he said. “I sure do not appreciate being among the most
expensive three or four community colleges in the country”
(Bartley, 1997).
Ambivalence on the campuses extended to the state’s
media as well. The Boston Herald—whose editorial pages had
been firmly in Carlin’s corner throughout his chairmanship—
was virulently opposed. Students attending a free community
college, they argued, would lack seriousness of purpose. “A completely free education will attract people quite unsuited for it. It
will tempt others into wasting time while they try to figure out
what to do with their lives, a species of student all too common
on all kinds of campuses” (“You Get What You Pay For,” 1997, p.
16).
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“This country is
heading for
unprecedented class
and racial strife in
the early 21st
century. The rich are
getting richer and
the poor are staying
poor,” [Carlin] said.

Editorials in The Boston Globe similarly questioned the
motivation of students who would attend a free college. The
Globe’s most conservative columnist, Jeff Jacoby, called the idea
“a disaster” that would destroy the state’s private sector and
benefit only “aimless freeloaders with no interest in academics”
(Jacoby, 1997, p. A12). The Globe editorials also mentioned practical and political issues, including giving up millions in federal
financial aid and tax credit programs, and the state’s perennial
lack of commitment to higher education during tight budget
years (“Making College Affordable,” 1997).
Carlin responded with a Globe editorial of his own. “This
country is heading for unprecedented class and racial strife in
the early 21st century. The rich are getting richer and the poor
are staying poor,” he said. “Only with education can those who
live on the economic margins today reach for something better”
(Carlin, 1997, p. A12). He noted that California’s community
college system, widely regarded as the best in the nation, was
no cost for many years and remains low in cost today. “One can
make a strong case that community colleges are the most vital
link in our education system, the link that gets thousands of
individuals from poverty or near-poverty to a more secure and
fruitful economic life,” he added. “As this happens throughout
the United States, racial and class tensions will drastically diminish as millions realize the American dream” (Carlin, 1997,
p. A12).
By the following month, however, Carlin realized that he
would need to scale back his plans. Although there was little
enthusiasm for eliminating charges entirely, many supported
making it easier for low- and middle-income students to attend
community colleges. Integrating the Clinton Administration’s
higher education incentives—the HOPE Scholarship and Lifetime Learning tax credits—would accommodate middle-income
families as well. Students with family incomes below $32,000
would attend community college at no net cost, and students
from families making less than $80,000 would pay a net cost of
only $500 per year. The cost of increasing the scholarship program was only $8.1 million, compared to the $90 million represented by Carlin’s first proposal.
To an extent, the program was simply effective marketing. The state had no control over the Federal Pell Grant program or federal tax credits, but it could account for those funds
when calculating student financial aid packages. Thus with only
a modest increase in state scholarship funds, the state could
advertise sweeping guarantees to students. An unpublished independent analysis conducted by the Institute for Higher Education Policy found that approximately 20,000 current community
college students would qualify for the “no cost” guarantee
(Merisotis & Phipps, 1997).
The BHE voted to approve the new policy in October
1997, but to be implemented, the program was dependent upon
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legislative funding to be implemented. The House passed a plan
identical to the board’s, but the Senate decided to go one step
further. The Senate Ways and Means Committee was chaired by
Stanley C. Rosenberg of Amherst, a proud graduate of the University of Massachusetts. Rosenberg knew that eliminating tuition and fees was not politically palatable, but he liked Carlin’s
idea of establishing a simple policy that all potential students
could understand. Thus, whereas the House version limited student charges to $780 per year for students with family incomes
below $80,000, the Senate limited charges to $500 per year for
all students, regardless of income. Rosenberg believed his idea
had two major advantages. “First you make it clear that community college is accessible to people and that a college education is in your reach,” he argued. “Number two, so many students have to spend three, four or five years to complete a twoyear program because they have to work” (Carey, 1998, p. 1).
The matter was ultimately resolved in conference committee. For students with family incomes up to $80,000, charges
would be limited to $500 per year. Students with family incomes
exceeding $100,000 would pay full price. And students with
family incomes below $36,000 would pay nothing.
The resulting program, known as the Community College Access Grant, nearly tripled scholarship aid in one year
(Table 3). The only worry for campuses was accommodating the
students. “Our enrollment could go through the roof and we
could experience tremendous difficulty shoehorning people into
the campus,” one enrollment dean said. “It’s a nice problem to
have” (Estrin, 1998, p. 1). Mt. Wachusett Community College
president Dan Asquino wasn’t convinced. “Probably not,” he
replied. “The vast majority of our students are already getting
some kind of aid, including loans. A cap would ease the burden
of loans” (Melady, 1998, p. 1).
To a certain extent, Asquino turned out to be right. In
fall 2001, the Community College Access Grant program was
extended to the state colleges. Based on state data, Dale Hamel
calculated that loan burden had fallen from $3.4 million in fiscal year 1998 to just over $1 million in fiscal year 2002, a decline
Table 3
Massachusetts Community College Access Grant Program,
Fiscal Years 1998 to 2002
FY98

FY99

FY00

FY01

FY02

%

Enrollment

38,564

41,498

43,232

44,098

44,892

16.4%

Tuition waivers
Cash grants
Total

$2,422
$2,813
$5,235

$4,300
$10,912
$15,212

$4,915
$13,999
$18,914

$5,144
$16,245
$21,388

$5,753
$16,245
$21,997

138%
477%
320%

$490

260%

Total grant per FTE student

$136

$367

Source: Board of Higher Education (2002b).

44

VOL. 36, NO. 2, 2006

$438

$485

of 71%. Hamel was convinced that this was the real benefit of
the Community College Access Grant program. “Forget price,
forget financial aid,” he said. “It’s what’s the impact on the students after they leave the college in terms of what the saddle on
them is.” Asquino turned out to be wrong about one thing: The
community colleges experienced an FTE enrollment increase of
7.6% during the first year alone (Board of Higher Education,
2002a).

Consequences for
Public Higher
Education

This combination of financial incentives—the tuition cuts, TAP,
and the Community College Access Grants—were seen by board
staff as policies that linked together to produce an effective system of higher education finance. BHE Chancellor Judith I. Gill
is fond of talking about her niece to illustrate how a real student would be affected by these policy changes:
My niece finished her associate’s degree at Greenfield
Community College with a grade point average above
3.5, and immediately moved over to UMass Amherst at a
reduced tuition rate so that she was able to save one full
year’s worth of college costs and then to reduce the cost
of college for her junior and senior years at UMass
Amherst… All of this had been possible as a result of the
policies that the board has put in place and truly is something that enables individuals in the Commonwealth to
afford an education that might not be possible otherwise. (J. I. Gill, personal interview, 2005)
These policies had enthusiastic support from board members and staff alike, if not always the institutions (Bastedo,
2005a). While most campuses believed that Carlin’s main goal
was cutting the cost of higher education to the state, he said his
main concern was prices for students and families. According
to Gill, Carlin confided in her one night, two years into his chairmanship, “Whether you believe it or not, Judy, there is not one
night that I go to bed that I don’t think about how to lower the
cost of education for students” (J. I. Gill, personal interview,
2005).
The impact of these policies—TAP and the Community
College Access Grants in particular—seem to have improved financial access. The state’s performance on affordability has
improved on the report card issued by the National Center for
Public Policy and Higher Education (NCPPHE, 2004). Although
the state’s overall grade declined due to California’s dramatic
increase in scholarship aid in 2000, the indicators showed improvement. For example, the percentage of grant aid allocated
to low-income students, as a percentage of Federal Pell Grant
aid, grew from 72% in 2000 to 90% in 2002, ranking Massachusetts ninth among U.S. states. The board seems committed
to continuing and even building upon these gains in the future.
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Although we should
strive for increased
financial efficiency,
institutions cannot
adapt in perpetuity;
eventually, core
services will have to
be cut and quality
will decline.
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This research also suggests that we should remain seriously concerned about stability in tuition pricing and the impact
of tuition cuts on institutions (Bastedo, 2005b). In Massachusetts, the revenue costs of tuition cuts were borne almost exclusively by the state’s General Fund. Increasingly, however, states
are imposing tuition restraints simultaneously with reductions
in state appropriations. By squeezing institutions at both ends,
lawmakers expect institutions either to increase private and
auxiliary sources of revenue or to increase efficiency. Although
we should strive for increased financial efficiency, institutions
cannot adapt in perpetuity; eventually, core services will have
to be cut and quality will decline. This is not simply an issue of
politics–the pressures of burgeoning Medicaid and other nondiscretionary spending in state budgets has created structural
deficits that will be impossible to sustain without tax increases
(Kane & Orszag, 2003).
Policymakers should be equally concerned, if not more
so, about the impact of tuition cuts on student access and
affordability. Over the past two decades, the burden of college
costs has shifted substantially from state appropriations and
grants to parental resources and student loans (Ehrenberg, 2002;
Mumper & Freeman, 2005). In Massachusetts, six years of tuition cuts were followed by a massive increase in both tuition
and fees, stunning parents and students. A long line of research
on the nexus between college costs and student persistence in
higher education makes it clear that tuition charges have a vital
impact on student access and attainment (Paulsen & St. John,
2002). Although the effects of this particular phenomenon have
yet to be studied empirically, long periods of restrained tuition
followed by sharp increases in a single year can be expected to
have deleterious effects on the ability of students to enroll and
persist.
A related issue is the concentration of low-income and
minority students in the community college system (Bastedo,
2006; Bastedo & Gumport, 2003; Perna, et al., 2005). The financial policies pursued in Massachusetts each served to encourage students to enroll in community colleges rather than
four-year colleges. Tuition reductions were greater at community colleges, and the TAP cut tuition by one-third for students
who started at these institutions. Low-income students could
attend state and community colleges at no cost to themselves or
their families, but they did not have the same options at the
University of Massachusetts. These changes are well intentioned
and will help low-income students attend state and community
colleges. But they will also result in a stratification of student
opportunity by social class and a reduction in overall baccalaureate achievement and attainment (Bastedo & Gumport, 2003;
Paulsen & St. John, 2002; St. John, Paulsen, & Carter, 2005).
For the higher education system to meet its goals of true access
and opportunity for all students, these equity issues must be
addressed.
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